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THE RIGHT TO REFUSE ANTIPSYCHOTIC
DRUGS: SAFEGUARDING THE
MENTALLY INCOMPETENT
PATIENT'S RIGHT TO
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
INTRODUCTION
In the early 1950s, a new class of drugs was developed to assist psychia-
trists in the treatment of psychoses.1 Since their introduction, antipsychotic
drugs2 have revolutionized the mental health profession.3 Although anti-
psychotic drugs alleviate the major disruptive manifestations of mental ill-
ness,4 they have equally disruptive side effects.5 Within the psychiatric
profession, the use of these drugs to treat psychotic patients remains contro-
versial as psychiatrists debate the benefits and long term risks of anti-
psychotic drug administration.6
The most recent controversy is whether a patient has the right to refuse
treatment with antipsychotic drugs. The debate revolves around whether
the patient or the doctor should decide when the patient should receive
treatment. The irony of the situation is that competent patients allowed to
refuse treatment remain in the institution because the lack of treatment ren-
ders them too dangerous to be released. Thus, the question of whether in-
1. See Comment, The Forcible Medication of Involuntarily Committed Mental Patients With
Antipsychotic Drugs, 15 GA. L. REV. 739 (1981) (citing Davis, Antipsychotic Drugs, in 2 A. FREE-
MAN, H. KAPLAN, & B. SADOCK, COMPREHENSIVE TExTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY II 1921 (2d ed.
1975)).
2. "Psychotropic. Affecting the psyche; denoting, specifically, drugs used in the treatment of
mental illnesses." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1167 (24th ed. 1982).
3. See DuBose, Of the Parens Patriae Commitment Power and Drug Treatment of Schizophre-
nia: Do the Benefits to the Patient Justify Involuntary Treatment?, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1149, 1151
(1976); Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty: Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness and Libertarian The-
ory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375, 378-80 (1982); Comment, Involuntary Commitment and the Right to
Refuse Treatment with Antipsychotic Drugs, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 719, 722-24 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter Comment, Involuntary Commitment]; Comment, Psychiatry With a Conscience: A Survey of
the Right to Control Psychotropic Medication and the Involuntarily Committed Mental Patient, 54
TENN. L. REV. 85, 86-90 (1986) [hereinafter Comment, Psychiatry With a Conscience].
4. See infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
5. For a discussion of the side effects of psychotropic medication, see infra notes 30-41 and
accompanying text.
6. See Comment, supra note 1.
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voluntarily committed mental patients7 have the right to refuse such
treatment has created much legal controversy.'
More than seventy years ago, Judge Cardozo proclaimed that "[e]very
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body." I More recent writings have echoed this
principle.10 Additionally, federal courts in the 1970s relied on the four-
7. When the state seeks to involuntarily commit a person for mental care, it must establish a
fair procedure for determining that the person is dangerous to himself or herself or others due to a
mental illness. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.9, at 500
(1982). The legitimacy of civil commitment was upheld in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418
(1979), where the Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment requires a "clear and con-
vincing" standard of proof in a civil proceeding brought under state law to involuntarily commit
an individual to a mental hospital for an indefinite period. Id. at 433.
8. See United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (right to refuse granted); Dau-
tremont v. Broadlawns Hosp., 827 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1987) (state interest overrides right to re-
fuse); Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983) (right to refuse granted); Osgood v.
District of Columbia, 567 F. Supp. 1026 (D.D.C. 1983) (right to refuse recognized); Davis v.
Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (right to refuse recognized); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F.
Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979) (right to refuse granted), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st
Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub. nom., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Rennie v.
Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978) (single action) and 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979) (class
action) (right to refuse granted), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated
and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983); Barnes v. Dale, 530
So. 2d 770 (Ala. 1988) (right to be free from unnecessary medication confirmed); Riese v. St.
Mary's Hosp. & Medical Center, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1388, 243 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1987) (informed
consent required before antipsychotic drugs may be administered); People v. Medina, 705 P.2d
961 (Colo. 1985) (informed consent required); In re Bryant, 542 A.2d 1216 (D.C. Ct. App. 1988)
(court used substituted judgment of trial court and administered drugs); In re Orr, 176 Ill. App.
3d 498, 531 N.E.2d 64 (1988) (right to refuse recognized); In re Mental Commitment of M.P., 500
N.E.2d 216 (Ind. 1986) (right to refuse recognized); Guardianship of Linda, 401 Mass. 783, 519
N.E.2d 1296 (1988) (right to refuse granted); Rogers v. Comm'r of Dept. of Mental Health, 390
Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983) (incompetent patients appointed a guardian to monitor treat-
ment); Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (right to refuse recognized);
Matter of Rice, 410 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (state interest balanced against patient's
right to refuse treatment); Opinion of the Justices, 123 N.H. 296, 465 A.2d 484 (1983) (finding of
incompetency needed before forcibly administering drugs); In re Hospitalization of B., 156 N.J.
Super. 231, 383 A.2d 760 (1977) (right to refuse denied); Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y. 2d 485, 495
N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1986) (informed consent needed to administer psycho-
tropic drugs); In re Mental Health of K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1980) (right to refuse granted);
State ex. reL Jones v. Gerhardstein, 141 Wis. 2d 710, 416 N.W.2d 883 (1987) (right to refuse
granted). See generally Rhoden, The Right to Refuse Psychotropic Drugs, 15 HARV. C.R. - C.L. L.
REV. 363 (1980); Note, A Common Law Remedy for Forcible Medication of the Institutionalized
Mentally Ill, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1720 (1982).
9. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
10. See Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960); 1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES: MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 20 (1982) (Government Printing Office). For a
discussion of what constitutes a "sound mind," see Hipshman, Defining a Clinically Useful Model
for Assessing Competence to Consent to Treatment, 15 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 235
(1987).
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teenth amendment in order to fashion a limited constitutional right to re-
fuse antipsychotic medication.'1 Most state and federal courts are now in
agreement that a competent, 2 involuntary mental patient possesses the
right to make decisions regarding his or her own treatment.
When the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Rennie v.
Klein,' 3 Rogers v. Okin, 4 and a case involving the rights of the mentally
retarded, Youngberg v. Romeo, 5 medical professionals were hoping for a
final ruling on the constitutional rights of hospitalized mentally ill and men-
tally retarded patients. Instead, the Supreme Court left the status of the
federal right to refuse antipsychotic medication uncertain. As a result, indi-
viduals must look to the state courts to fashion a method by which a patient
may refuse antipsychotic medication.' 6
This Comment begins with an examination of antipsychotic drugs and
addresses the inherent struggle they create as a result of their intrusiveness
and efficacy. Next, a background of the right to refuse medical treatment is
presented which discusses the doctrine of informed consent and traditional
tort theories that may provide a basis for challenging forcibly administered
medication.' 7 This Comment next argues that although incompetent pa-
tients are unable to give the informed consent necessary to refuse treatment,
guardians ought to be appointed to insure that the decision to administer
drugs is reviewed. An assessment of the competing state interests which
may override a patient's decision to refuse follows. After concluding that
common law remedies inadequately recognize a right to refuse anti-
psychotic medication, an analysis of the various constitutional guarantees
that may lead to a successful objection to forcible medication will be dis-
cussed. Finally, this Comment concludes with a call to the federal courts
and legislature to implement procedural due process protection for incom-
petent, mentally ill patients.
11. See Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 915; Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1342; Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at
1131; see also Note, supra note 8, at 1720.
12. For a discussion of competence and incompetence, see infra notes 48-58 and accompany-
ing text.
13. 458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
14. 451 U.S. 906 (1981).
15. 451 U.S. 982 (1981).
16. The Supreme Court in Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 302 (1982), suggests that federal
procedural due process protection will be applied when state law provides a substantive right to
refuse antipsychotic medication for treatment purposes. Id. at 303-04.
17. For purposes of this Comment, the phrases "forcibly medicate" and "forcibly administer"
refer not only to the injection of the patient with a drug against his or her will, but also to the
patient's consent to treatment through undue influence, coercion, or duress by hospital staff.
1990]
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I. ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS IN THE TREATMENT OF PSYCHOSIS
A. Historical Development of Psychiatric Care
Societies have cast aside the mentally ill throughout history. I" As late
as 1840, a majority of committed patients were confined to cages, locked
rooms and outhouses. 9 The only treatments available were the following:
barbiturates, bromides, narcotics and drugs for sedation; soothing baths,
shock therapy with insulin, atropine or convulsant drugs; and neurosurgery
that included prefrontal leucotomy.
20
Over time, the attitude of society has shifted and the overriding concern
has become one of public safety and humane conditions. Since most of the
controversy regarding the right to refuse medication has centered around
the forcible use of antipsychotic drugs, their effects and side effects have
received the greatest attention.21 In the 1950s, a new era began in the treat-
ment of psychiatric disorders with the introduction of psychotropic drugs. 22
Since then, they have become the most frequently prescribed medication for
institutionalized patients.23 Antipsychotic drugs are most commonly used
18. In 1785, a French physician wrote about the mentally ill as follows:
Thousands of deranged are locked up in prisons without anyone's thinking of administer-
ing the slightest remedy; the half-deranged are mixed with the completely insane, the furi-
ous with the quiet; some are in chains, others are free in the prison; finally, unless nature
comes to their rescue and cures them, the term of their misery is that of their mortal days,
and unfortunately in the meantime the illness but increases instead of diminishing.
R. WHITE & N. WATr, THE ABNORMAL PERSONALITY 6-7 (4th ed. 1973).
19. A. TYLER, FREEDOMS FERMENT: PHASES OF AMERICAN SOCIAL HISTORY TO 1860 305
(1944).
20. R. BALDESSARINI, CHEMOTHERAPY IN PSYCHIATRY 2-3 (1985).
21. Comment, An Involuntary Mental Patient's Rights to Refuse Treatment With Anti-
psychotic Drugs: A Reassessment, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1135, 1139 (1987).
22. Psychotropic drugs are classified into four categories: (1) antipsychotic drugs (major
tranquilizers), used to treat schizophrenia and related psychosis; (2) antidepressant drugs; (3) lith-
ium, used to treat manic-depressive psychosis; and (4) antianxiety drugs (minor tranquilizers),
used to treat situational and neurotic anxiety. Symonds, Mental Patient's Rights to Refuse Drugs:
Involuntary Medication as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 701, 704
(1980). Many courts limit their definition of psychotropic drugs to antipsychotic drugs because
the latter have severe side effects. See, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 653 n.l (lst Cir. 1980).
Most of the litigation has revolved around antipsychotics. For this reason, the term "anti-
psychotics" will be used throughout this Comment. Lay people are most familiar with anti-
psychotic medication by their brand names: Prolixin (brand of fluphenazine), Haldol (brand of
haloperidol), Stelazine (brand of trifluoparazine). Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental
Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 461, 474 n.77 (1977) (citing Crane, Two
Decades of Psychopharacology and Community Mental Health: Old and New Problems of the
Schizophrenic Patient, 36 TRANSACTIONS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 644, 656 N.1 (1974)).
23. Symonds, supra note 22, at 705. Psychotropic drugs are the most "firmly established of
all the pharmacotherapies in the treatment of mental disorders." Plotkin, supra note 22, at 474.
See also Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 926 (N.D. Ohio 1980). After noting that approxi-
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in the treatment of psychoses, particularly schizophrenia. 24 "The drugs, by
influencing chemical transmissions in the brain, sedate the schizophrenic
and suppress psychotic symptoms such as delusions, hallucinations, and
other disorders. '25
Although antipsychotic drugs cannot cure mental illness, they can limit
some of the most oppressive symptoms, thus allowing patients to function
outside a mental hospital. 26 Additionally, because administration of anti-
psychotic drags is the preferred method of treating mental illness, patients
have had shorter hospital stays and have been able to return to work and to
live a more meaningful existence.27 One authority maintains that with
proper drug maintenance therapy, relapse can be prevented for a substantial
number of schizophrenic patients.28 Although the advent of psychotropic
mately seventy-three percent of the patients at the Lima State Hospital received psychotropic
drugs which were prescribed by both licensed and unlicensed physicians, the Davis court re-
marked that "[p]sychotropic drugs are not only over prescribed; they are also freely prescribed."
Id. Additionally, schizophrenia is the most frequently diagnosed mental illness among institution-
alized patients. Dubose, supra note 3, at 1151 (fifty percent of all mental hospital beds are occu-
pied by schizophrenics).
24. The major symptoms of psychosis are hallucinations, delusions, and severe thought disor-
der. Severe agitation and disrupted sleep often accompany these symptoms. Hallucinations are
false perceptions, typically voices, while delusions are false beliefs that do not yield to a rational
argument. Severe thought disorder is a breakdown in the logical relationship between one
thought and the next. Beck, Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medication: Psychiatric Assessment and
Legal Decision-Making, 2 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILrrY L. REP. 368, 371 n.1 (Sept.-Oct.
1987).
25. Note, Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medication: A Proposal for Legislative Consideration,
17 IND. L. Rv. 1035, 1038-39 (1984).
26. See Symonds, supra note 22, at 704.
27. See Comment, Madness and Medicine: The Forcible Administration of Psychotropic
Drugs, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 497 n.4 (1980).
28. Symonds, supra note 22, at 705 (citing AMA DEPARTMENT OF DRUGS, AMA DRUG
EVALUATIONS 420, 428 (3d ed. 1977)). One psychiatric treatise views the advantages of anti-
psychotic drugs as follows:
The discovery of... these drugs had profound effects on psychiatric practice. Although
[antipsychotics] did not usually produce a permanent cure in schizophrenia, it did benefit
greatly many patients in a way no treatment had ever done before.... The therapeutic
revolution initiated by [antipsychotic drugs] went far beyond the mere pharmacological
effects of the drug. Previously, many mental hospitals had been primarily custodial in
character. The fact that clinically significant therapeutic effects could be produced by a
drug created an atmosphere that emphasized positive treatment and led to the vigorous
application of milieu therapy, psychotherapy, group therapy, and occupational therapy.
The greater use of these social therapies was made possible by the control, through medica-
tion, of the more disruptive and destructive aspects of the patient's illness. The fate of
many patients who would otherwise have been permanent residents of the mental hospital
was profoundly altered. Some were helped so much that they were able to remain out of
the hospital and function in the community. Other patients were discharged to nursing
homes or halfway houses. For those remaining in the mental hospital, the hospital became
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drugs brought with it positive effects for patients, the increased freedom
came at a high price. Side effects are "serious, long-lasting and potentially
more disruptive than the illness itself."2 9
B. The Intrusive, Hazardous and Uncertain Nature
of Antipsychotic Drugs
Judicial opinions recognizing a right to refuse treatment focus on the
temporary and permanent nature of the side effects that accompany the use
of antipsychotic drugs. Some temporary side effects, such as akathesia,3 °
dystonia,31 and a Parkinsonian syndrome32 disappear when medication is
discontinued.33 Akathesia, dystonia, and Parkinsonian syndrome can be
minimized by lowering the dosage, withdrawing the patient from anti-
psychotic drugs, or through the use of anti-Parkinsonian drugs.34 For
many patients, long-term use of antipsychotic medication will result in
tardive dyskinesia, an irreversible disorder characterized by involuntary,
rhythmic movements of the face, mouth, tongue, and jaw.35 There is no
treatment for this devastating side effect. It is apparent that antipsychotic
a more humane place. And schizophrenic patients who become ill today can often be
treated effectively by antipsychotic medication without hospitalization.
Id. at 704 n.21 (citing Davis, Antipsychotic Drugs, in A. FREEDMAN, H. KAPLAN & B. SADOCK,
COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1921-22 (2d ed. 1975)). For a discussion of the
likelihood that a patient given antipsychotic medication will improve, see generally Dubose, supra
note 3.
29. Comment, Pathway Through the Psychotropic Jungle: The Right to Refuse Psychotropic
Drugs in Illinois, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 407, 411 (1985).
30. Commonly known as "the jitters," akathesia is a temporary condition and gives the pa-
tient a feeling of restlessness in which he or she cannot remain still but feels compelled to move
and pace. E. MAGGIO, THE PSYCHIATRY-LAW DILEMMA 225 (1981). The research on akathesia
indicates that it is frequently misdiagnosed as a psychotic symptom. As a result, an increase in the
very medication that caused the akathesia may be prescribed. Note, supra note 8, at 1727.
31. Dystonia refers to "bizarre muscular spasms, primarily in the head and neck, often com-
bined with facial grimaces, involuntary spasms of the tongue and mouth interfering with speech
and swallowing, convulsive movements of the arms and head, bizarre gaits, and difficulty in walk-
ing." Symonds, supra note 22, at 707 n.37.
32. The Parkinsonian syndrome has many of the same symptoms as Parkinson's Disease. It
is characterized by a mask-like face, rigidity, retarded volitional movements, drooling, and trem-
ors. Id. at 707 n.35.
33. The immediate effect on the patients is sedative. Byck, Drugs and the Treatment of Psy-
chiatric Disorders, in THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 158 (L. Goodman & A.
Gilman eds. 1975). However, many side effects do not appear until two or three weeks after the
administration. Rhoden, supra note 3, at 378.
34. Symonds, supra note 22, at 707-08.
35. Tardive dyskinesia strikes between five and thirty percent of those taking antipsychotic
medication over a period of years. No one antipsychotic medication is more or less likely to cause
tardive dyskinesia than any other. Psychiatrists generally believe that the risk of tardive dyskine-
sia increases as the patient's lifetime dose increases. One psychiatrist recommends using anti-
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drugs produce effects that are independent of the volition of the patient and
in this respect can be labeled intrusive.36
In addition to the hazardous side effects, other factors contribute to the
danger of prescribing antipsychotic drugs. Current diagnostic approaches
are imprecise and imperfect,37 and psychiatrists have difficulty determining
the proper drugs to prescribe for the various illnesses.3" Misdiagnosis is as
high as fifty percent.39 Consequently, antipsychotic drugs are prescribed
not only to those suffering from schizophrenia, but also inappropriately to
those exhibiting symptoms of the illness. As a result, patients must contend
psychotic drugs only when indicated, and in the lowest possible effective doses. Beck, supra note
24, at 371 n.2.
Another concern of tardive dyskinesia is that the first symptoms do not appear until treatment
is long underway. Sudden withdrawal at this point may be too late to prevent the disease, and a
change in medication may not prevent the symptoms from appearing. E. MAGGIO, supra note 30,
at 228-29.
36. Comment, supra note 27, at 534. "A mental health treatment may be called 'intrusive'
when the treatment does not involve the patient as a participant so much as it involves him as a
passive recipient of procedures and substances that can change his thinking processes, personality,
or behavior patterns." Id. (citation omitted).
One recipient of a psychotropic injection depicts his experience this way:
There is no other feeling like it. Nothing to relate it to, no experience anyone would nor-
mally go through in their life. It affects you mentally and physically and you feel suicidal.
The physical effects are so bad you can't stand it.... You get so tired (as if you've been up
three days in a row) you lie down. But you can't stay down for more than three or four
minutes because your knees begin to ache, an itching type ache.... Your thoughts are
broken, incoherent; you can't hold a train of thought for even a minute. You're talking
about one subject and suddenly you're talking about another.... Your mind is like a slot
machine, every wheel spinning a different thought.
Opton, Psychiatric Violence Against Prisoners: When Therapy is Punishment, 45 MIss. L.J. 605,
641 (1974).
The attorney for the plaintiff in Jones v. Gerhardstein, 141 Wis. 2d 710, 416 N.W.2d 883
(1987), preserved the plea of his client in his notes and describes the feelings of a man who would
rather take the chance of returning to the state of schizophrenia than experience "'the living
death of being on major tranquilizers.'" Zander, A Committed Patient's Right of Informed Con-
sent, 61 WIs. BAR BULL. 45, 46 (Nov. 1988).
37. For a review of studies concerning the validity and reliability of psychiatric evaluations,
see Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Court-
room, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693, 699-734 (1974). One psychiatrist describes a set of standards for
evaluating the quality of a psychotropic drug regimen in the form of fourteen questions. He also
suggests that in some mental health institutions, antipsychotic drug therapy is not always pre-
scribed in a prudent manner. Sovner, Assessing the Quality of a Psychotropic Drug Regimen, in
THE RIGHT TO REFUSE ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATION 48 (American Bar Association, 1986).
38. In those patients properly diagnosed, the antipsychotic drugs produce only temporary
symptomatic relief. However, an accurate diagnosis is rare and the correct prescription is even
more uncertain. See Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1139-40 (D.N.J. 1978).
39. See Pope & Lapinski, Diagnosis in Schizophrenia and Manic-Depressive Illness: A Reas-
sessment of the Specificity of "Schizophrenic" Symptoms in Light of Current Research, 35
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 811 (1978) (describing unreliability in diagnosis).
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with the prevalent misuse of the potent medication and cope with the sev-
eral side effects resulting from inappropriate prescriptions.
An additional problem associated with antipsychotic drugs is their im-
proper control and abuse. Because society offers few incentives for those
working in mental institutions, the result is often the employment of less
qualified psychiatrists. The typical setting is one of an overworked, un-
derpaid staff with insufficient resources to care for the patients. The district
court in Davis v. Hubbard found that antipsychotic drugs are often used for
purposes other than treatment, such as for the convenience of the staff and
as a means of punishment.' Due to inadequate staffing and resources, as
well as the number of difficult patients, antipsychotic drugs have been used
for control rather than therapy.4 1
Considering the severe side effects and other problems associated with
the administration of antipsychotic drugs, it is easy to comprehend why
many mental patients wish to refuse these drugs and instead elect to suffer
from the psychoses.
II. THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO REFUSE
Courts that have confronted the issue of a patient's right to refuse anti-
psychotic drugs have closely examined the competing interests of both the
patient and the state. The state has an interest in administering treatment
pursuant to commitment42 while the patient has an interest in remaining
free from bodily intrusion.
The institutionalized mentally ill were traditionally unable to seek re-
dress under common law remedies because they were deemed to be incapa-
ble of consenting to treatment.43 Thus, most of the litigation in this area
was brought on a constitutional basis. Before analyzing the constitutional
40. Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 926-27. The district court noted that the drugs are freely pre-
scribed by both licensed and unlicensed physicians who may prescribe them regardless of whether
the patient is assigned to that physician or whether that physician has seen the patient. Id. at 926.
41. See generally Furrow, Public Psychiatry and the Right to Refuse Treatment: Toward an
Effective Damage Remedy, 19 HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REv. 21, 23-30 (1985) (discussion of the state
of psychiatric hospitals).
42. In 1965, Congress passed the 1964 Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act which estab-
lished a statutory right to treatment in the District of Columbia. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-562
(Supp. 1985). Two years later in Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966), a court found
for the first time a right to treatment. Id. at 455. See generally Note, The Right to Treatment:
Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1355 (1986).
43. See, e.g., Howard v. Howard, 87 Ky. 616, 623, 9 S.W. 411,413 (1888); Denny v. Tyler, 85
Mass. (3 Allen) 225, 227 (1861) (patient is "incapable of forming a judgment concerning his own
condition or the means requisite for his... restoration"); In re Bakes, 8 L. Rep. 122, 125 (Mass.
1845); Price v. Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250, 239 N.W.2d 905 (1976).
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basis for a right to refuse antipsychotic medication, it is useful to examine
the common law origin of treatment refusals and the state interests that
conflict with that right.
A. Common Law Analysis of Forcible Medication
1. Doctrine of Informed Consent as Applied to Involuntarily
Committed Patients
The right of an individual to decide whether to undergo medical treat-
ment has long been recognized by common law under the doctrine of in-
formed consent.' Underlying this doctrine is the principle that individuals
ought to be protected from "unjustified intrusions on personal security."'4
However, the concept of informed consent for institutionalized mental pa-
tients has been controversial.
Non-mentally ill persons are generally protected from forcibly adminis-
tered medication. However, in the case of involuntarily committed mental
patients, early opinions held that such patients were "ipso facto" incompe-
tent to make decisions regarding treatment.46 Such determinations implic-
itly equated civil commitment with a determination of legal
incompetency.47 This attitude shifted as courts began to apply the doctrine
of informed consent to mental patients subjected to unwanted treatment.
Although the analytical subtleties of informed consent are beyond the scope
of this Comment, it is important to understand the elements of informed
consent: voluntariness, knowledge, and competency.48
44. W. KEETON, D. DoBBs, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 18
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. The doctrine of informed consent was first
enunciated in Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d
170 (1957). For a discussion of the origins of this doctrine, see Meisel, The Expansion of Liability
for Medical Accidents: From Negligence to Strict Liability By Way of Informed Consent, 56 NEB.
L. REv. 51, 74-86 (1977). For a critique of the development of the informed consent doctrine, see
Katz, Informed Consent - A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PrrT. L. REv. 137 (1977).
45. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977); Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141
U.S. 250, 251 (1891). The Supreme Court in Botsford stated that "[n]o right is held more sacred,
or is more carefully guarded... than the right of every individual to the possession and control of
his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law." Id.
46. See Comment, supra note 1, at 743; see also supra note 43.
47. Id.
48. See Kaimowitz v. Dept. of Mental Health, Civ. No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne
County, Mich., July 10, 1973).
"To date, relatively few empirical studies have evaluated the elements of informed consent,
particularly the adequacy of the information needed for mentally ill patients to make informed
medical choices." (citing LIDZ, MEISEL, ZERUBAREL, CARTER, SEsTAK, & ROTH, INFORMED
CONSENT: A STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING IN PSYCHIATRY 24-32 (1984)). The most comprehen-
sive study suggests that patients are not receiving adequate information and that many patients
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First, the issue of voluntariness becomes significant in a mental hospital
because so many factors undercut the voluntary nature of the consent in a
mental hospital setting. 9 Threat of force, fraud, coercion, deceit and du-
ress jeopardize the element of voluntariness.5 ° The judge or jury must de-
cide whether actions taken in a hospital constitute sufficient negative
influences on the patient to legally invalidate the voluntariness of the
decision.51
Secondly, knowing consent is required before administration of treat-
ment.5 2 There are two contrasting standards used to determine whether the
consent is knowledgeable. The first, known as the community standard,
was established in Natanson v. Kline. 3 The standard looks to what other
doctors in that area of specialization and geographical area would do under
similar circumstances.5" The second standard is interpreted in Canterbury
v. Spence.5 It emphasizes the right of patients to make their own medical
decisions based on sufficient information provided to them to facilitate their
understanding of the risks and benefits of a proposed treatment. 56 The
quality of the information given is critical.57
The third element of informed consent, which varies among jurisdic-
tions, is competency. Although competency has been defined in many ways,
one author has identified two elements common to most definitions: "the
capacity to assimilate relevant facts, and an appreciation or rational under-
standing of one's situation as it relates to the facts."5 8, Most state statutes
no longer equate civil commitment with incompetency but view the two as
separate and distinct concepts. To do otherwise interferes with the princi-
are not primarily concerned with using the information that is available to make their own deci-
sions. Parry, Legal Parameters of Informed Consent Applied to Electroconvulsive Therapy, in THE
RIGHT TO REFUSE ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATION 33 (American Bar Association 1986).
49. See Parry, Decision-Making Rights Over Persons and Property, in S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY &
M. WEINER, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 34 (American Bar Foundation 3d ed.
1985).
50. See id. at 448.
51. See Parry, supra note 48, at 34. Parry suggests that it is unwise to presume that any
decision by a mentally ill patient is voluntary because patients in institutions are isolated and
vulnerable. Id.
52. Id.
53. 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960) (patient charges hospital and physician for injuries sustained
as a result of an excessive dose of radioactive cobalt during radiation therapy).
54. Id. at 1098.
55. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
56. Id. at 782-83.
57. For a discussion of the various case law and statutory modifications which undercut pa-
tient protection and defend physicians, see Parry, supra note 49, at 34-35.
58. Beck, supra note 24, at 369. An analysis of the two basic elements of competency is
included in this article.
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pie behind informed consent, which allows the patient to decide the manner
in which his or her treatment will proceed. Merging the two concepts need-
lessly deprives a patient of essential personal rights.
One final aspect of consent remains: the issue of substitute consent for
incompetent patients.59 This situation arises when a person has been adju-
dicated incompetent to make specific medical decisions, and the court au-
thorizes a guardian to give substitute consent. A guardian is authorized to
assist the patient in properly exercising his or her right of self-determination
and personal autonomy. Unfortunately, a guardian is not always ap-
pointed. Even when a guardian is appointed, often there is no review of his
or her decision to insure that it is consistent with what the patient would
have favored if competent. Failure to provide a guardian after incompe-
tency has been determined to be a violation of due process. Furthermore, if
self-determination is to be maintained for an incompetent person, a guard-
ian must be appointed, and review of that decision should be made.
2. A Tort Theory for Refusing Treatment
Under the common law of torts, the right to refuse medical treatment
has emerged from the doctrines of trespass6' and battery,6 which apply to
an unauthorized touching by a physician. Consent is a defense to battery or
trespass, and, therefore, physicians must obtain consent before commencing
treatment.62 Except where the state has acted pursuant to a privilege aris-
ing from its parens patriae authority6 3 or police power,6" the common law
protection of bodily autonomy has protected persons from compelled treat-
ment.65 However, in the case of an involuntarily committed mental patient,
early decisions reflected the attitude that these individuals were incompe-
59. See infra notes 221-41 and accompanying text.
60. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 44.
61. A battery is a harmful or offensive contact with a person, resulting from an act intended
to cause the person or third party to suffer such a contact, or apprehension that such a contact is
imminent. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965).
62. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 44.
63. See infra notes 84-99 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 100-09 and accompanying text.
65. See Note, supra note 8, at 1736-37. In Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161, 166 (1905), aff'd,
224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906), the court noted:
[Uinder a free government at least, the free citizen's first and greatest right, which under-
lies all others - the right to the inviolability of his person, in other words, his right to
himself- is the subject of universal acquiescence, and this right necessarily forbids a physi-
cian or surgeon, however skillful or eminent.... to violate without permission the bodily
integrity of his patient by a major or capital operation ....
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tent to make treatment decisions.66 Despite the fact that this presumption
has been refuted by federal court decisions,67 modem psychiatric literature
and recent state statutory enactments,68 involuntarily committed patients
are often denied relief under common law battery actions.69 Thus, it is not
surprising that involuntarily committed mental patients began to challenge
forced medication on constitutional grounds.70
Additional tort theories may apply to the patient's dilemma. Recently,
many malpractice suits have involved instances in which either the physi-
cian was negligent in obtaining informed consent,71 or the treatment itself
was performed in a negligent fashion regardless of whether consent had
been obtained.' 2  Traditional torts, such as intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress and invasion of privacy, may provide a patient with grounds
to object to forcible medication with antipsychotic drugs. 73
B. Balancing Competing Interests May Override a
Patient's Individual Liberties
The same interests that justify a state's power to commit apply when
subjecting a patient to treatment without his or her consent. 74 These inter-
ests are divided into two categories and must be balanced against the indi-
vidual's liberty before any forcible medication can be administered. State
66. See supra notes 44-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relationship between
competence and informed consent.
67. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1361 (D. Mass. 1979); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F.
Supp. 1131, 1145-46 (D.N.J. 1978).
68. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.825 (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 393.12(2)(a) (West
Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-14-1.6-7 (Bums 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2929 (Supp.
1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-3-104(5) (Supp, 1986).
69. See Comment, Psychiatry With a Conscience, supra note 3, at 92. The hospitals claim that
tort liability would severely disrupt, if not immobilize, the administration of an institution. Id.
70. See infra notes 131-219 and accompanying text for a constitutional analysis of the right to
refuse antipsychotic drugs.
71. Stone, The Right to Refuse Treatment: Why Psychiatrists Should and Can Make it Work,
38 ARCHIvEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 358 (1981).
72. See Winick, The Right to Refuse Psychotropic Medication: Current State of the Law and
Beyond, 7, 8 THE RIGHT TO REFUSE ANTIPsYCHOTIC MEDICATION (American Bar Association
(1986)). The good faith of the physician would not defeat such a claim even if the jurisdiction
recognized such a qualified immunity for intentional torts. Failure to divulge potential risks of
antipsychotic drugs may also constitute malpractice as it frustrates a fully informed consent. Id.;
see also Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 663 (1st Cir. 1980).
73. See Winick, supra note 72, at 8; see also Friedman, Legal Regulation of Applied Behavior
Analysis in Mental Institutions and Prisons, 17 ARIz. L. REv. 39, 55 (1975).
74. See Note, supra note 8, at 1738. For an excellent analysis of civil commitment standards,
see Comment, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Il, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190 (1974).
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interests include the authority to act as parens patriae75 and to enforce its
police power.76 The state's authority to act as parens patriae enables it to
care for those persons unable to care for themselves.77 The doctrine of
parens patriae was employed in an attempt to justify compulsory education
in the landmark case of Wisconsin v. Yoder 71 and has been applied to the
involuntary commitment of those unable to survive in the community.7 9
Under the police power, the state has authority to protect the community,"0
to enforce compulsory vaccination laws," and to commit dangerous men-
tally ill people.8 2 The distinction between the two interests is useful because
the factors that are relevant to the assessment of state activity to provide
care for the helpless differ from those that compel the state to protect the
community from danger.83
1. Parens Patriae as a Basis to Compel Treatment
The parens patriae interest grew out of English common law preroga-
tives of the king who had the power to act as "the general guardian of all
75. "'Parenspatriae,' [literally] 'parent of the country,' refers traditionally to the role of the
state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability." BLAcK's LAW DIcTIONARY
1003 (5th ed. 1979).
76. See infra notes 100-09 and accompanying text.
77. See, eg., Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971). In Winters, a 59-year-old woman,
who had never been found incompetent, was involuntarily admitted to a hospital, and given medi-
cation despite her objections that her Christian Scientist background forbade such treatment. Be-
cause there was never any finding of legal incompetency, the state could not validly undertake to
treat her using its parens patriae authority. Id. at 70-71.
78. 406 U.S. 205, 229-31 (1972). In Yoder, the respondents were Amish parents who objected
to Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law because their children's attendance at a private
or public school would be contrary to the Amish way of life. The state's interest in universal
education is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges upon other fundamental
rights such as the free exercise clause and the parents' interest in the religious upbringing of their
children. The state's parens patriae power could not be sustained. Id.
79. See Comment, supra note 74, at 1207-22 and sources cited therein.
80. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). In Addington, appellant was committed to
various institutions and later arrested on a misdemeanor charge of assault by threat. "[T"he state
... has authority under its police power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies
of some who are mentally ill." Id. at 426. See also Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 934-35
(N.D. Ohio 1980); Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1145.
81. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1905) (small pox vaccination). The police
power of a state embraces such reasonable regulations established by legislative enactments to
protect the public health and safety. Id. In Cude v. State, 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964),
the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that parents had no legal right to prevent the vaccination of
their children who would be prohibited from attending school, notwithstanding good faith reli-
gious beliefs of the parents. Id. at 821.
82. Note, supra note 8, at 1738.
83. Id.; see, eg., Addington, 441 U.S. at 426 (discussing the dichotomy of state interests).
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infants, idiots, and lunatics."'8 4 Although the basic function of the doctrine
has been accepted in the United States, the Supreme Court has enlarged its
scope beyond the original common law purpose." Thus, while a state may
not use its parens patriae authority to shield its citizens from federal law,86
it may exert the power to assure the benefits of federal law are not denied to
its citizens.8 7
The doctrine is used as the basis for state laws that protect the cus-
tody,8 8 care8 9 and education of children;90 the regulation of child labor;91
and the prosecution and detention of juvenile delinquents.92 Each instance
involves a situation in which the community has recognized that, but for
the state protecting these individuals' interests, their future well-being
would be jeopardized. Society also has placed voluntary commitment of
individuals93 and appointment of a guardian94 under the guise of the parens
patriae authority.
84. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972) (quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES *47). Blackstone defines "prerogative" as "that special pre-eminance which the King
hath over and above all other persons, and out of the ordinary course of common law, in right of
his royal dignity." Note, Parens Patriae Suits By a State Under 42 U.S. C. § 1983, 33 CASE W.
RES. 431, 444 n. 118 (1983) (quoting J. CHrrTy, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE PREROGA-
TIVES OF THE CROWN 4 (London 1820 & photo reprint 1978) (quoting I W. BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES *239)).
85. The enlargement of the purpose of parens patriae first became apparent in Louisiana v.
Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900). Louisiana sought injunctive relief against Texas officials who were
prohibiting Louisiana merchants from distributing their goods in Texas under the guise of a quar-
antine statute designed to combat yellow fever. Id. at 8.
86. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485 (1923). The Supreme Court stated that "[i]t
cannot be conceded that a State, as parens patriae, may institute judicial proceedings to protect
citizens of the United States from the operation of the statutes thereof." Id.; see also Massachu-
setts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970) (a state has no right to challenge the draft).
87. Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico ex. rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607-08 (1982) (Puerto
Rico had standing to sue to enjoin preferential hiring and treatment of foreign laborers vis-a-vis
Puerto Ricans; a state may seek to assure its residents that they will have full benefit of federal
laws).
88. See Heinemann's Appeal, 96 Pa. 112, 42 Am. Rep. 532 (1880).
89. See, e.g., People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411111. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344
U.S. 824 (1952) (blood transfusion of eight day old daughter was allowed over objections by par-
ents due to their religious beliefs).
90. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law as applied
to Amish children would gravely impair the free exercise of their religious beliefs).
91. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (statute forbidding minors to work
did not violate a fundamental right in a case in which a parent furnished religious literature to be
distributed in the streets).
92. See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1966) (although a state stands in
parens patriae to a juvenile detainee, this is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness).
93. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 581-83 (1975) (confinement of a non-
dangerous patient who is not receiving treatment is unconstitutional); In re Balley, 482 F.2d 648,
650 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Hammon v. Hill, 228 F. 999, 1000-01 (W.D. Pa. 1915).
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Although limited to some extent, the doctrine ofparenspatriae empow-
ers a state to administer treatment to a patient without obtaining consent 5
and thus conflicts with the patient's liberty interest to refuse such treat-
ment. This vestige ofparenspatriae authority, although broad, is limited in
order to safeguard common law bodily autonomy rights against state intru-
sion. For example, parens patriae does not allow the state to order treat-
ment for a patient who is able to make treatment decisions for himself or
herself, unless that person has been determined legally incompetent, 96 no
matter how foolish or irrational the behavior may be.97 In the absence of a
life-threatening emergency,98 courts have refused to order treatment having
a substantial risk or uncertain prognosis. 99
2. State's Police Power to Compel Treatment
A state's police power to protect its citizens from harm also has been
used to justify forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs to mentally ill
patients. The police power also extends to situations within a mental insti-
tution to ensure the safety of staff and other patients."°
In Rogers v. Okin o the court held that a hospital could forcibly medi-
cate in an emergency situation "in which a failure to do so would result in a
substantial likelihood of physical harm to that patient, other patients, or to
staff members of the institution."10' 2 On appeal the First Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the state's police power in administering antipsychotic
medication, holding that it outweighed the patient's liberty interest in refus-
ing medication. However, the First Circuit criticized the lower court's
94. See, e.g., In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 623, 629, 105 Cal. Rptr. 736, 740 (Ct. App. 1972);
Witter v. Cook County Comm'rs, 256 Ill. 616, 622-24, 100 N.E. 148, 150 (1912); In re Guardian-
ship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981).
95. See, e.g., Winters, 446 F.2d at 71.
96. See supra notes 44-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of legal competency.
97. See, e.g., Winters, 446 F.2d at 71; Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 383-85, 376
N.E.2d 1232, 1235-36 (1978) (a senile and competent woman who refuses an operation which is
required to save her life cannot be compelled to submit to it); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super.
282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978) (man with gangrene in both legs cannot be forced to consent to
amputation).
98. Courts have defined emergency as both "violence threatening" and "health threatening."
Rogers, 634 F.2d at 660. By using both terms, the court has confused the concept of parens
patriae and police power; parens patriae refers only to the latter.
99. Note, supra note 8, at 1744. See, e.g., In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955);
In re Hofbauer, 65 A.D.2d 108, 411 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1978).
100. See, e.g., Jones v. Gerhardstein, 141 Wis. 2d 710, 718, 416 N.W.2d 883, 886 (1987);
Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 934.
101. 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979).
102. Id. at 1365.
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opinion as being too simplistic. 1 °3 The court favored, instead, a balancing
approach overseen by qualified state physicians. 1" Forcible medication
would take place only when the need to prevent violence outweighed the
possibility of harm to the medicated patient, and the "reasonable alterna-
tives to the administration of antipsychotics [are] ruled out."1 5
Other decisions reflect the idea that the state may justify exerting its
police power in order to protect the hospital staff and other patients by
administering antipsychotic drugs in emergency situations. 10 6 On remand
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Rennie v. Klein 10 7 held that anti-
psychotic drugs may be constitutionally given to patients "whenever, in the
exercise of professional judgment, such an action is deemed necessary to
prevent the patient from endangering himself or others." 108
It is undisputed that the state has an interest in preventing a patient's
condition from deteriorating under the parens patriae authority and an in-
terest in protecting society from those dangerous mentally ill persons.
However, a due process consideration arises when determining the scope of
a state's interest in overriding the patient's refusal. Without considering
these questions, a mentally ill patient's right to bodily autonomy would be
severely curtailed. Although there is agreement that the inherent power of
a state includes protection of its citizens, the police power may be improp-
erly invoked to justify forcible medication in situations which are less than
an emergency. Additionally, states do not agree on the scope of the parens
patiae power to care for those unable to care for themselves. Nevertheless,
103. Rogers, 634 F.2d at 656-57.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 656.
106. Gilliam v. Martin, 589 F. Supp. 680, 682 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (prisoner's right to be free
from being subjected to antipsychotic medication was overridden by a clear indication that failure
to take medication would result in regression and reappearance of dangerous, psychotic behav-
ioral tendencies); Weiss v. Missouri Dep't of Mental Health, 587 F. Supp. 1157, 1161 (E.D. Mo.
1984) (when a forensic patient in a mental health facility became hostile and made threatening
remarks to other patients, he was determined to pose a danger to others); Project Release v.
Prevost, 551 F. Supp. 1298, 1309 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983) (legitimate
state interests including the patient's treatment needs and the safe and orderly operation of the
institution supported a finding that the right to refuse treatment is not absolute); People v. Me-
dina, 705 P.2d 961, 973-74 (Colo. 1985) (state must embellish the likelihood that the patient, due
to his condition, will cause serious harm to himself or others in the institution, the fact that a
patient may have been violent on some occasion in the past is not sufficient); Opinion of the
Justices, 123 N.H. 296, 301, 465 A.2d 484, 489 (1983) (finding of probable cause for involuntary
hospitalization "does not indicate that [a patient] will continue to present a threat to himself or
others after he has been hospitalized"; such a threat would have allowed the hospital to utilize
antipsychotic medication).
107. 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
108. Id. at 269.
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federal cases hold that a qualified constitutional right exists for competent,
involuntary patients, and it is hoped that other courts will recognize that
right.10 9
3. The Least Restrictive Alternative Doctrine
The least restrictive alternative standard provides that if less restrictive
means are available, which would accomplish the government's purpose in
a manner that intrudes less on the fundamental right at issue, then the least
restrictive alternative must be chosen. 110 Thus, in the context of an invol-
untarily committed patient's right to refuse antipsychotic medication, the
existence of a less restrictive treatment"' must be considered in order to
determine whether the right to refuse such drugs overrides the state's inter-
ests and powers."12 Under this standard, less intrusive therapies must be
contemplated when a patient refuses antipsychotic drugs, before more in-
trusive means are administered.
In Rennie v. Klein 113 the Third Circuit was confronted with the issue of
a mental patient's right to refuse antipsychotic drugs and the task of defin-
ing the scope of that right." 4 It concluded that a constitutional right exists
"to be free from treatment that poses substantial risks to [one's] well being
. . "115 Recognizing that such a right is not absolute,"' but must be
limited by legitimate governmental concerns, five members of the court con-
cluded that the loss of liberty suffered by a patient forcibly medicated can-
109. See infra notes 150-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the federal right to
refuse antipsychotic medication.
110. See Winick, supra note 72, at 16.
111. Alternative treatments that may be less detrimental or restrictive include smaller dos-
ages, a different drug entirely, different therapy, or perhaps physical restraints such as a straight-
jacket to prevent abusive patients from harming themselves or others. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d
836, 847 (3d Cir. 1981). Various alternatives are available to psychiatrists when treating a men-
tally ill patient. These therapies include non-intrusive counseling or behavior modes, such as
milieu therapy, psychotherapy and behavior modification. Note, Conditioning and Other Technol-
ogies Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L.
REv. 616, 619-33 (1972).
112. Comment, The Scope of the Involuntarily Committed Mental Patient's Right to Refuse
Treatment With Psychotropic Drugs: An Analysis of the Least Restrictive Alternative Doctrine, 28
ViLL. L. REv. 101, 129-30 (1982). The enforcement of the state's interest in these cases is mani-
fested in the state's parens patriae and police 'power. Id. at 130.
113. 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981).
114. Id. at 844-45.
115. Id.
116. Application of the principle does not demand "hourly or daily judicial oversight," but
rather a "balance [struck] between efficiency and intrusiveness." Id. at 847. The court favored
applying the principle to a treatment program rather than individual dosages of medication. Id. at
847-48.
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not exceed that required by needed care or legitimate administrative
concerns, and must be the "least intrusive infringement" available." 7
In Price v. Sheppard ' the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the least
restrictive alternative test and held that the court must determine the rea-
sonableness and necessity of the proposed treatment before more intrusive
forms of treatment, such as electroshock therapy or psychosurgery, may be
administered to non-consenting patients. 1 9 In Youngberg v. Romeo 2 0 the
Third Circuit implemented the doctrine in the case of an institutionalized
mentally retarded patient.' 2 ' The patient alleged that the hospital improp-
erly shocked him, did not protect him from other dangerous residents, and
afforded him inadequate treatment.' The Third Circuit indicated that
"[w]here the issue turns on which of two or more major treatment ap-
proaches is to be adopted, a 'least intrusive' analysis may well be appropri-
ate."' 23 Recognizing that both the effectiveness of a course of treatment
and its side effects must be considered, the court advised the State to err in
favor of the patient's safety.'24
The applicability of the least restrictive alternative principle, in the con-
text of the right to refuse antipsychotic medication, remains in doubt after
Romeo. However, where the intrusion is more serious than the short term
use of physical restraints, the application of a less restrictive alternative is
117. Id. at 845. The court defined the least intrusive means standard not as prohibiting all
intrusions into a patient's personal liberty, but rather avoiding those intrusions "which are unnec-
essary or whose cost benefit ratios, weighed from the patient's standpoint, are unacceptable." Id.
at 847. The court found support for this standard in congressional and state legislation and in a
decision by a federal court of appeals. Id. at 846-47 n. 13 (citing the Mental Health Systems Act,
42 U.S.C. § 9401-9503 (Supp. 1981); S. Rep. No. 712, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 77, reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3372, 3444); Rogers, 634 F.2d 650.
118. 307 Minn. 250, 239 N.W.2d 905 (1976).
119. Id. at 262-63, 239 N.W.2d at 913.
120. 644 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
121. Id. The Supreme Court did not expressly address the least restrictive alternative doc-
trine in its disposition of the case. Id. at 313-14 n.14. Therefore, this Comment suggests that the
Third Circuit's acceptance of the doctrine cannot be considered vacated.
The least restrictive alternative has been applied in other cases of the mentally handicapped,
but in reference to the patient's environment, not to medical prescription. See, eg., Welsh v.
Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis.
1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 473, order on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis.
1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), order reinstated on remand,
413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Wyatt v. Alderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (3d Cir. 1974).
122. Romeo, 644 F.2d at 154-56. The patient suffered from physical attacks by other patients
resulting in a broken arm, a fractured finger, and other injuries. Id. at 155. The defendants kept
plaintiff shackled to a bed or chair for long periods of time and failed to give him adequate medi-
cal attention after initiation of the suit. Id.
123. Id. at 166.
124. Id. at 166 n.45.
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demanded.12 For example, in Winston v. Lee126 the Supreme Court held
that a proposed surgery to remove a bullet from a criminal suspect violated
the fourth amendment's ban on unreasonable searches and seizures.1 27 By
applying a "compelling need" standard,128 the Court found the individual's
interest in maintaining "personal privacy and bodily integrity"' 29 out-
weighed the state's interest in finding evidence of guilt, where the state had
alternative means at its disposal to accomplish the desired end. 130
III. A CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS TO REFUSE ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS
After experiencing little success with common law remedies, involunta-
rily committed patients began to challenge forcible medication on constitu-
tional grounds. The United States Constitution and state constitutions are
the most important bases for the right to refuse antipsychotic drugs. A
growing body of case law recognizes that a qualified constitutional right to
refuse intrusive mental health treatment is essential to an individual's reten-
tion of personal liberty. Personal liberty is protected by a variety of consti-
tutional guarantees: the first amendment's protection of freedom of speech
and free exercise of religion;' the eighth amendment ban on cruel and
unusual punishment; 3 2 the right to privacy;' 33 and the fourteenth amend-
ment limitations on the state's power to deprive any person of life or liberty
without due process of law.'34 The foregoing are capable of limiting gov-
ernmental imposition of unwanted therapy.
In the late 1970's and early 1980's, state district courts held that compe-
tent patients have a qualified right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic
125. It has been suggested that the reason the least restrictive alternative doctrine was not
required in Romeo was because of the temporary nature of the intrusion. The liberty in being free
from restraints may not rise to the level of interest in being free from the binds of mental intru-
sions presented by antipsychotic drugs. See Winick, supra note 72, at 20. This is particularly
worthy of extreme caution in light of the side effects of the drugs.
126. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
127. Id. at 767.
128. Id. at 766.
129. Id. at 764.
130. Id.
131. The first amendment guarantees in part that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
132. The eighth amendment guarantees that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
133. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
134. The fourteenth amendment reads in part "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
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drugs. 135 The subsequent litigation in the courts of appeal modified and
refined the substantive remedy, significantly limiting the basic right. In
1982 it was further limited by the Supreme Court.1 36 As a result, state
courts have responded by instituting due process protection for the involun-
tarily committed competent mental patient. 37 Now states must protect the
rights of an incompetent patient.
A. The Eighth Amendment Is No Longer Applicable
Since many of the early decisions dealing with the right to refuse medi-
cation were based on criminal cases, 131 the ban on cruel and unusual pun-
ishment provided the first real basis for challenging forcible medication. 139
Problems arose when medication was given as punishment in response to
belligerent or uncooperative behavior. An example of this was presented in
Knecht v. Gillman,"4 where the vomit-inducing drug apomorphine was
given to patients for "not getting up, for giving cigarettes against orders, for
135. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 634 F.2d
650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Rennie
v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978) (single action), 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979)(class
action) modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on re-
mand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
136. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
137. See, e.g., Goedecke v. State, 198 Colo. 407, 603 P.2d 123, 124 (1979) (Colorado due
process clause prevented a patient who was not irrational or unreasonable in his refusal to submit
to treatment with antipsychotic medication, from being forced to undergo treatment with drugs
having serious deleterious side effects); In re Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40
(1981); Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986) (the right of a
competent adult to refuse medical treatment was determined to be a fundamental common law
right, coextensive with the patient's liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the New
York Constitution); Jones v. Gerhardstein, 141 Wis. 2d 710, 416 N.W.2d 883 (1987).
138. Cf. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983) (insanity acquitee); Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480 (1980) (convicted felon); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972) (sexual deviate); Peo-
ple v. Lang, 76 Ill. 2d 311, 391 N.E.2d 350 (1979) (defendant indicted for murder found unfit to
stand trial); In re Ottolini, 73 Ill. App. 3d 971, 392 N.E.2d 736 (1979) (defendant indicted for
murder found unfit to stand trial).
139. See Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946-47 (3d Cir. 1976); Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352,
357 (7th Cir. 1974); Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1973); Knecht v. Gillman,
488 F.2d 1136, 1140 (8th Cir. 1973); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 503 (D. Minn. 1974)
(court held a determination was to be made of whether particular practices and conditions vio-
lated a patient's right to treatment); Sawyer v. Sigler, 320 F. Supp. 690, 694 (D. Neb. 1970) (court
held that the requirement by prision officials that a patient take his medication in crushed or
liquid form, which would cause nausea, was sufficiently unusual and arbitrary to constitute both
cruel and inhumane punishment). But see Osgood v. District of Columbia, 567 F. Supp. 1026,
1032-33 (D.D.C. 1983) (treatment does not inflict unnecessary or wanton pain); Rennie, 462 F.
Supp. at 1143 (psychotropic drugs are effective and therapeutic and therefore are not
punishment).
140. 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973).
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talking, for swearing, or for lying." 141 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected the state's contention that the injection was "treatment" and held
that such a practice constituted cruel and unusual punishment when admin-
istered without informed consent.1 42
In 1976 the Supreme Court broadened the traditional eighth amend-
ment concept of "punishment" in Estelle v. Gamble.143 An inmate of a
Texas state prison brought suit against prison officials for depriving him of
medical treatment. 1" The Supreme Court held that by ignoring the in-
mate's medical needs, the officials had violated the eighth amendment pro-
tection guarantee against infliction of pain. 4 5 Thus, deprivation of
treatment, or inaction, was considered to be an infliction of pain, and, there-
fore, punishment. 146 Difficulty resulted when the eighth amendment was
applied in the context of a mental hospital setting. As courts began to rec-
ognize a more human condition for mental health patients and hospitals
improved the conditions for patients the connection between treatment and
punishment became more strained, and eighth amendment challenges be-
came less successful. 147
Using the eighth amendment as a basis for recovery created problems
since institutions have an obligation to provide treatment. The problem in-
tensified with evidence of the effectiveness of psychotropic drugs in treating
psychoses. 148 How could the patient claim an infliction of punishment
when the institution was carrying out its duty to treat? 49 Unless the un-
necessary administration of drugs for punitive purposes can be demon-
141. Id. at 1137.
142. Id. at 1138-40. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also applied the eighth amendment
to ban the use of succinycholine which causes sensations of suffocation in prisoners as part of an
adverse conditioning program in Mackey, 477 F.2d at 877. Similarly, in Nelson, 491 F.2d at 356,
the Seventh Circuit held that antipsychotic drugs used in a juvenile correctional institution were
not "part of an ongoing psychotherapeutic program, but for the purpose of controlling excited
behavior." Id.
143. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 103-04.
146. Id. at 104-05. For an argument in favor of the eighth amendment as a measure to ensure
committed patients the right to refuse medication, see Symonds, supra note 22, at 717.
147. Comment, supra note 29, at 417. Because of the emerging right to treatment, mental
hospitals were under an obligation to improve the institutional conditions. Therefore, a claim of
cruel and unusual punishment was increasingly difficult to prove. Id. at 417 n.47. A patient had
to prove that the treatment amounted to "indifference or intentional mistreatment," or that it was
"sufficiently unusual, exceptional and arbitrary." Sawyer, 320 F. Supp. at 694-96. Such a show-
ing became impossible as the atmosphere in most institutions was improving.
148. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the positive effects of
antipsychotic drugs.
149. Comment, supra note 29, at 417-19.
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strated, an eighth amendment basis for a right to refuse antipsychotic
medication is difficult to establish. Therefore, patients challenging forcible
medication must now premise their claim on the right to privacy as given
by the fourth amendment and the first amendment, not the eighth
amendment.
B. A Federal Constitutional Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs
Recognized Under the Right to Privacy and the First
Amendment
Although earlier cases had suggested the existence of a constitutional
right to refuse treatment in dictum and commentary, 150 the first cases to
actually recognize the right to refuse antipsychotic drugs as treatment were
Rennie v. Klein 151 in 1978 and Rogers v. Okin 152 in 1979. While the results
in the courts were the same, there are striking differences between the pro-
cedures for ensuring the right to refuse in Rennie 153 and Rogers.154
1. Rennie v. Klein: A Right to Privacy
The federal district court in Rennie based a patient's right to refuse anti-
psychotic drugs on the individual's right to protect his mental processes
from governmental intrusions and the right to bodily autonomy. 155 In the
absence of an emergency, the court found these rights to be protected by the
constitutional right to privacy.156 John E. Rennie was a diagnosed para-
noid schizophrenic whose behavior had been controlled by forcibly ad-
150. A right to refuse treatment has been advanced on a variety of constitutional grounds.
See, e.g., Scott, 532 F.2d at 946-47 (forcible medication may violate first, eighth or fourteenth
amendments); Knecht, 488 F.2d at 1139 (eighth amendment); Mackey, 477 F.2d at 878 (first or
eighth amendment); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1971) (first amendment), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); Souder v. McGuire, 423 F. Supp. 830, 832 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (first or
eighth amendment); Kaimowitz v. Dept. of Mental Health, Civ. No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct.
Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973) (first amendment); Comment, supra note 74, at 1194-95 and
n.12 (right to privacy); Note, Advances in Mental Health: A Case for the Right to Refuse Treat-
ment, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 354 (1975) (first and fourteenth amendment).
151. 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978). This case arose in New Jersey where the state superior
court held that involuntarily committed mental patients had no right to refuse antipsychotic medi-
cation. Id. at 1145; In re B., 156 N.J. Super. 231, 383 A.2d 760 (1977).
152. 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979). Rogers arose in Massachusetts where the State
Department of Health had authorized injections of medication, absent patient consent, by order of
a physician.
153. For the procedural safeguards set forth in Rennie, see infra notes 155-179 and accompa-
nying text.
154. For the procedural safeguards set forth in Rogers, see infra notes 180-199 and accompa-
nying text.
155. Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1144-45.
156. Id.
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ministering a host of psychotropic, as well as antipsychotic, drugs.' 5 7 Suit
was brought under the federal Civil Rights Act 5 ' which prohibits govern-
mental officials from interfering with the civil rights of citizens.1 59 Because
the hospital was already administering the least restrictive alternative treat-
ment, the district court denied Rennie's motion for a preliminary
injunction. 6'
After analyzing the constitutional issues, the district court found no vio-
lation of the eighth amendment 61 and no violation of the first amend-
ment's "freedom of expression."' 62 However, the constitutional right to
privacy was considered broad enough to protect mental processes from gov-
ernmental interference and to establish an individual's autonomy over his
own body.' 63 Only where the state can show a "strong countervailing inter-
est can the right to refuse to be qualified."'" The court also held that in the
absence of an emergency, some form of a due process hearing is required
prior to the forcible administration of drugs.' 65 The court further con-
cluded that Mr. Rennie had received all the process to which he was due.166
In a subsequent class action in Rennie, the district court repeated its
holding that mental patients had a right to refuse antipsychotic drugs and
granted a preliminary injunction that required a state hospital to hold hear-
ings to determine whether patients may be medicated against their will.' 67
157. Id. at 1135-40.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
159. Id.
160. Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1146-47. Rennie's physician testified that the best treatment for
him was both antipsychotic medication and lithium. Id. at 1140.
161. Id. at 1143. The court rejected Rennie's argument to enjoin the use of medication based
on the eighth amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The court noted that the use of
drugs had been proven effective and that the staff had justifiably administered the drugs as treat-
ment, not as a punishment. Id.
162. Id. Inclusive within the first amendment is both the right to think and to communicate.
The court stated that since the side effects of the drugs were temporary, the dulling of the senses
which the drugs caused did not rise to first amendment violations. Id. at 1143-44.
163. Id. at 1144 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 397 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) and Mackey, 477 F.2d at
878).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1147. The court set forth the factors which constitute due process: (1) patients
must be informed and partake in the decision-making process regarding their treatment; (2) a
lawyer must be present to assist patients; (3) an independent psychiatrist to evaluate the need for
medication (a hospital-retained psychiatrist is not sufficient); (4) patient's lawyer and psychiatrist
must have access to hospital records. Id. at 1147-48.
166. Id. at 1147. One author suggests that Judge Brotman believed that second opinions by
qualified psychiatrists were necessary to improve the quality of care in state hospitals. The court
was attempting to transform the right to refuse treatment into a right to assure proper and neces-
sary treatment for involuntary mentally ill patients. See Stone, supra note 71, at 360.
167. Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1313-15.
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The court broadened this right to include both voluntary and involuntary
patients.'68 Because the court recognized that the right to refuse was not
absolute, Judge Brotman reiterated his earlier holding that the decision
must be an individualized one based on several factors:
(1) The patient's physical threat to others;
(2) The capacity of the patient to decide on the particular treatment;
(3) The existence of any less restrictive alternatives; and
(4) The risk of permanent side effects on the patient.' 69
Concentrating on procedural aspects, the court reasoned that a decision
based on these factors would amount to an appropriate balancing of the
risks and benefits of a proposed treatment. 170
The court next outlined minimum procedures that are required to pro-
tect a patient's constitutional rights. First, the state must provide a written
consent form containing information on drugs and patient rights. Second, a
state must implement a system of patient advocates, given the dual respon-
sibility of representing patients at hearings and retaining independent psy-
chiatrists to make the ultimate determination at those hearings. Next, an
informal review by an independent psychiatrist is required before medica-
tion can be given to an involuntary patient. Finally, a state must enforce a
voluntary patient's right to refuse treatment if necessary.171 Medication can
only be given without consent in three circumstances: (1) When there is a
sudden and significant change in the patient's condition which creates a
danger to the patient or others; (2) When the involuntary patient is declared
legally incompetent; 172 or (3) When an involuntary patient is functionally
incompetent. 73 Any of these situations negates the necessity of a due pro-
cess hearing.174
168. Id. at 1307.
169. Id. at 1297 (citing Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1145-48).
170. In the earlier case, an examination of these four factors indicated that an injunction
should not be issued. The court found Mr. Rennie's capacity to be severely limited and that the
present administration of thorazine was the least restrictive means of stabilizing his condition.
Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1151-53.
171. Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1313-15.
172. However, the court was careful to provide that when a decision to medicate an incompe-
tent patient has been made, the decision must be referred to a patient advocate. That person is to
assess the patient's feelings about the drug, its side effects, failure to consistently take medication
and the use of force or threat by hospital staff to administer the drug. Id. at 1314.
173. "Functionally incompetent" describes a person who is unable to provide knowledgeable
consent to treatment. There has been no declaration of legal incompetence by a court for a func-
tionally incompetent person. These cases must also be referred to a patient advocate to review the
case. Id.
174. Id. at 1313-14.
[Vol. 73:477
RIGHT TO REFUSE DRUGS
In 1981 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit af-
firmed the district court's holding in Rennie, agreeing that there is a right to
refuse medication based on the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.1 75 The court began its discussion by recognizing that "[t]he state
cannot ignore due process and simply seize a person and administer drugs
to him without his consent."1 76 The court next emphasized the importance
of this liberty interest as a right of "personal security" that could only be
overcome by a compelling state purpose. 177
The constitutional right to refuse antipsychotic drugs, as it survived the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, permitted refusal unless either of the fol-
lowing two situations occurred: (1) A physician certified that forcible medi-
cation was essential to prevent "serious consequences to a patient;" or (2)
After completely discussing the patient's treatment plan and an examina-
tion of that patient by the hospital director, the hospital decided the patient
should be treated with antipsychotic drugs. 7 ' Review by an independent
psychiatrist was not necessary but could be ordered by the medical director
at his or her discretion.1 79
2. Rogers v. Okin: A Right to Privacy and the First Amendment
In Rogers v. Okin,8° the district court in Massachusetts also held that
patients had a right to refuse medication absent a medical emergency.1 81
The plaintiffs, who were voluntary and involuntary patients at the Boston
State Hospital, challenged the policies of forcible medication in non-emer-
gency circumstances in a class action
1 82
The court first addressed the state's contention that once a patient was
admitted to an institution, he or she should not be considered competent to
decide whether to receive treatment. The court held that unless and until
there is an adjudication of incompetency, the presumption of competency
prevails.1 83 The Rogers court based the right to refuse treatment on the
constitutional right to privacy rooted in the first amendment.184
175. Rennie, 653 F.2d 836.
176. Id. at 843. The court noted that despite commitment, a patient still retains a "residuum
of liberty" protected by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 845.
177. Id. at 845.
178. Id. at 852-53.
179. Id. at 854.
180. 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979).
181. Id. at 1367-68.
182. Id. at 1352. The plaintiffs also alleged forced involuntary seclusion; however, this issue
is beyond the scope of this Comment and will not be discussed.
183. Id. at 1361.
184. Id. at 1366-67.
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Unlike the Rennie decision, Rogers found a first amendment basis for
the right to refuse antipsychotic drugs for involuntary patients.185 The
court noted that the first amendment protects the communication of
ideas18 6 and held that "[a]s a practical matter ... the power to produce
ideas is fundamental to our cherished right to communicate and is entitled
to comparable constitutional protection." 18 7 Thus, the right to decide im-
portant matters pertaining to one's life is a basic right, necessarily entailing
the decision whether to submit to the treatment with antipsychotic medica-
tion."' The court did not hold this right to be absolute, but stated that in
an emergency situation a patient may be forcibly medicated.18 9 Emergency
was defined as a situation in which failure to forcibly medicate "would re-
sult in a substantial likelihood of physical harm to that patient, other pa-
tients, or to staff members of the institution."' 19
On appeal the district court held that a person has constitutionally pro-
tected bodily integrity and privacy interests in deciding whether to take
antipsychotic drugs.191 The question of whether a first amendment basis for
refusal of treatment existed was not dealt with on appeal since the First
Circuit expressly declined to address the issue.192 The court did, however,
take a more tolerant view of the state's interests in forcibly medicating
185. Id. The court also found the right to refuse for voluntary patients, but this Comment is
narrowly focused on the involuntary patient's rights.
186. Id. at 1367.
187. Id. The court further wrote:
The right to produce a thought - or refuse to do so - is as important as the right protected
in Roe v. Wade to give birth or abort. Implicit in an individual's right to choose either
abortion or birth is an underlying right to think and decide. Without the capacity to think,
we merely exist, not function. Realistically, the capacity to think and decide is a funda-
mental element of freedom....
Whatever powers the Constitution has granted our government, involuntary mind con-
trol is not one of them.... The fact that mind control takes place in a mental institution in
the form of medically sound treatment of mental disease is not, itself, an extraordinary
circumstance warranting an unsanctioned intrusion on the integrity of a human being.
Id. It is interesting to note that the court, when discussing the first amendment, couched its
reasoning in terms of privacy. This emphasizes the inter-relatedness of these fundamental consti-
tutional guarantees when analyzed in the context of an intrusion by forcible medication.
188. Id. at 1367. This line of reasoning comports with other courts of appeals and federal
district courts' decisions: Mackey, 477 F.2d at 878 (drug induced condition may constitute an
impermissible interference with mental process); Kaimowitz, Civ. No. 73-19434-AW (psychosur-
gery impairs power to generate ideas thus violating the first amendment).
189. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1365. The shortcoming of the court's treatment of this issue is
its failure to outline procedures for determining an emergency situation. This apparently leaves
the determination of whether to treat patients up to the physicians or hospital staff who may be
very liberal in their interpretation of an "emergency." Id.
190. Id.
191. Rogers, 634 F.2d at 653.
192. Id. at 654 n.2.
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mental patients.193 Although privacy interests were constitutionally pro-
tected, the First Circuit identified two state interests that can override the
patient's right to privacy in the context of treatment refusal: (1) Theparens
patriae power in preventing a deterioration in the patient's mental condi-
tion;194 and (2) The police power in preventing harm to the patient or
others.195 The court criticized the district court for its attempt to "fashion
a single 'more-likely-than-not' standard" as a substitute for balancing these
state interests against the varying interests of the patients. 96 After weigh-
ing these factors, the First Circuit required a case by case balancing of the
state's interest versus the patient's interest in bodily autonomy. 197
Perhaps the most blatant disregard for the interests of an incompetent
patient was the court's holding that as a constitutional matter, a state is not
required to seek guardian approval for decisions to treat incompetent pa-
tients with antipsychotic drugs.198 Denial of the right to a guardian sug-
gests that an adjudication of incompetency automatically authorizes the
administration of antipsychotic drugs, arguably a violation of due
process. 199
C. The Supreme Court Leaves Incompetent Patients Unprotected
After two decades of avoiding constitutional issues of hospitalized men-
tally ill and mentally retarded patients, the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari in Rennie,2 "° Rogers,20 1 and a case involving the rights of the mentally
193. See Comment, supra note 29, at 422.
194. Rogers, 634 F.2d at 657-61.
195. Id. at 654-57. The court held that a state, under its police powers, may forcibly adminis-
ter medication only upon a determination that "the need to prevent violence in a particular situa-
tion outweighs the possibility of harm to the medicated individual" and that "reasonable
alternatives to the administration of antipsychotics must [have been] ruled out." Id. at 656. On
remand, the district court was left with the task of developing mechanisms to ensure that the staff
decisions accorded adequate procedural protection to the "interests of the patients." Id.
196. Id. at 656-57.
197. Id. at 657.
198. Id. at 660-61. The court based its conclusion on the presumption that to require physi-
cians to consult a guardian every time they choose to medicate would also lead to the opposite
result: physicians would consult a guardian in every instance they chose not to treat with anti-
psychotics. Id. at 660 (emphasis added). The court further suggested that physicians would be
deterred from recommending drug treatment due to the need to seek approval of a guardian. Id.
at 660 n.9. The court readily admits that such a result is not certain to occur. Id. at 661. The
following question necessarily arises: Why dismiss a right fundamental to due process for incom-
petent patients if the unsupported result created by the court is fiction? A much better system is
that followed by the district court in granting a guardian to make those treatment decisions when
a patient is declared incompetent. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1364.
199. See infra notes 220-41 and accompanying text.
200. 458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
201. 451 U.S. 906 (1981).
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retarded, Youngberg v. Romeo.2" 2 Because the Supreme Court did not de-
cide the cases on their merits, the status of the federal right to refuse treat-
ment after the disposition of these three cases remains uncertain.
1. Youngberg v. Romeo
Nicholas Romeo was a profoundly retarded, institutionalized adult with
the mental capacity of an eighteen-month old child.2 °3 Suit was brought on
his behalf against officials at a Pennsylvania state institution for violating
his constitutional rights to safe conditions of confinement, freedom from
bodily confinement and minimal habilitation.2 '4 The Supreme Court held
that Romeo had substantive rights that were protected by the fourteenth
amendment.20 5 These liberty interests include reasonably safe conditions of
confinement, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints, and such mini-
mally adequate training as reasonably may be required by those rights.20 6
After having defined the substantive rights due Romeo, the Court con-
sidered the proper standard for determining whether a state has adequately
protected the rights of an involuntarily committed mentally retarded indi-
vidual. The Court utilized a professional judgment standard to determine
whether a patient has been deprived of substantive rights. The Court rea-
soned that this standard adequately reflects the proper balance between the
legitimate interests of the state and the rights of the patients.20 7 Under this
standard the courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by a
qualified professional, which is presumed to be valid.208
202. 451 U.S. 982 (1981). The Court granted certiorari in two other cases dealing with the
constitutional rights of the mentally ill and mentally retarded. See Scott, 458 U.S. 1101; Pen-
nhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 457 U.S. 1131 (1982).
203. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 309.
204. Id. at 310-11. Romeo had been injured on at least sixty-three occasions, restrained for
long periods of time on a regular basis and lost some basic skills he had at the time of his admis-
sion. Id.
205. Id. at 314-19. Such substantive rights included the right to treatment while institution-
alized and the corresponding affirmative duty on the part of the institution to provide such treat-
ment. Id. at 317. However, this affirmative duty was seriously undermined in a recent Supreme
Court decision. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
The Court held that a physically abused child was not denied due process because the agency was
not required by the due process clause to provide protective services. Justice Brennan argues in
his dissent that in light of DeShaney, the personal liberty rights granted in Romeo are left unclear.
Id. at 210-11.
206. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 314-19.
207. Id. at 321. The Court added in a footnote, "[b]y 'professional' decision-maker, we mean
a person competent, whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular decision
at issue." Id. at 323 n.30.
208. Id. at 323.
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Since Romeo considered a mentally retarded patient's rights, it is not
clear whether Romeo is controlling over the issue of an involuntary mental
patient's right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs. However, in
light of the fact that the Supreme Court vacated the Rennie decision, and
remanded it for reconsideration due to Romeo,2" it appears that the deci-
sion by a professional to forcibly medicate a patient is also presumed to be
valid.2 10
2. Mills v. Rogers
The Supreme Court left the question of the constitutional right of an
involuntary patient to refuse antipsychotic medication undecided in Mills v.
Rogers.211 While the case was pending, In re Guardianship of Roe2 12 was
decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Court.213 It held that, absent an
overwhelming state interest, a judicial determination is required before a
non-institutionalized but mentally incompetent person can be forcibly med-
icated with antipsychotic drugs.21 4 Roe further held that a person does not
forfeit his protected liberty interest by virtue of becoming incompetent, but
is entitled to have his "substituted judgment" exercised on his behalf.21 '
Justice Powell, writing for a unanimous Court in Rogers, indicated that
the Massachusetts court, as a matter of state law, recognizes greater liberty
209. 458 U.S. 1119 (1982). The Supreme Court also vacated the Third Circuit's decision in
Scott, 641 F.2d 117, because of the decision in Romeo.
210. But see Scott, 691 F.2d at 637. On remand the Third Circuit Court of Appeals granted a
new trial on the issue of punitive and compensatory damages for the mental patient.
The Third Circuit's consideration of Rennie on remand interpreted Romeo to be a rejection of
the right to refuse treatment based on a least restrictive alternative standard. Rennie, 720 F.2d at
269. The court held that a medical authority's professional judgment will be presumed to be valid
unless it is shown to be a" 'substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice or
standards.'" Id. (quoting Romeo, 457 U.S. at 323).
211. 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
212. 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981).
213. Id. In Roe the guardian of an incompetent ward petitioned to forcibly medicate the
patient with antipsychotic drugs. The probate court granted the petition and the ward appealed
that decision. The Massachusetts Supreme Court vacated the probate court's order and extended
the right to refuse antipsychotic drugs to an incompetent, non-institutionalized ward. The court
held that if an incompetent person refuses antipsychotic medication, those charged with his pro-
tection must seek judicial determination of substituted judgment. Id. at -, 421 N.E.2d at 51-52.
214. Id. The court expressly stated its opinion was limited to outpatients. Id. at 453-54, 421
N.E.2d at 61-62. The court declined to comment on the appropriate procedures for forcible medi-
cation in an institutional setting. Id.
215. Id. at 434, 421 N.E.2d at 51. In framing the parameters for forcible medication of an
incompetent ward, the court in Roe stated that delegating the decision to the ward's guardian
would insufficiently safeguard his constitutional and common law rights. Id. A judge would
exercise substituted judgment to determine the decision the ward would have made if he were
competent. Id. at 432-33, 421 N.E.2d at 52.
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interests than those protected by the United States Constitution.216 Fur-
ther, the Court added this would require the Massachusetts court to grant
greater protection to the liberty interests of a patient than the federal consti-
tution's due process clause.2t 7 Thus, the Supreme Court declined to resolve
the constitutional issues raised in Rogers, vacating and remanding it until
state law questions had been determined.2 "8 After Rogers the ultimate fate
of the right of patients to refuse antipsychotic drugs on a federal level is
uncertain. 219 Romeo articulated standards to deal with the profoundly
mentally retarded in institutions and is arguably inapplicable to institution-
alized patients who may be competent to make their own treatment deci-
sions. However, because the Supreme Court vacated Rennie in light of
Romeo, it is likely that the court will adopt a different standard for mental
institutions.22° Since the Supreme Court uses the professional judgment
standard for competent parties, it is improbable that it will afford greater
liberty interests to an incompetent mentally ill patient refusing drugs.
Thus, the incompetent patient's rights to due process may be denied.
IV. THE NEED FOR DUE PROCESS PROTECTION
OF INCOMPETENT PATIENTS
It is well settled law that involuntarily committed individuals are consti-
tutionally entitled to refuse antipsychotic medication when they have not
been declared incompetent to refuse such drugs, nor pose immediate danger
to themselves or others. However, the Supreme Court, as well as many
state courts, is silent concerning procedural safeguards for an incompetent
patient. Once the decision to administer antipsychotic drugs has been
made, the incompetent patient is forcibly medicated regardless of his or her
216. Rogers, 457 U.S. at 303.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 306. The case was remanded to the Massachusetts Supreme Court to settle state
law issues. 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983). Thereafter, the First Circuit held that Massa-
chusetts' procedural rules regarding forcible medication created federally protected liberty inter-
ests under the due process clause because they "rise well above the minima required by any
arguable due process standard." Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1, 8 (1984). The procedural due pro-
cess protection in Massachusetts are as follows: (1) A requirement of a judicial decision-maker;
(2) Adversary proceedings; and (3) Detailed regulations governing the use of chemical restraints.
Id. at 7.
219. This is not the case with mentally ill prisoners. In Washington v. Harper, - U.S. -,
110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990), the Supreme Court upheld the prison policy of administering medication
to a competent, nonconsenting inmate only if, in a judicial hearing at which the inmate had proce-
dural protections, the State could prove that it was necessary for furthering a compelling state
interest. The state interest in this case was to prevent a mentally ill inmate from endangering
himself or others. Id. at 1038-39.
220. See Note, supra note 8, at 1735.
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refusals. There is a need to monitor the drug administration and a need to
review the physician's initial decision to medicate. The argument does not
center around the question of whether incompetent patients have a right to
refuse antipsychotic drugs, because they cannot give informed consent to
waive treatment.22 ' Rather, the courts and legislature should devise a due
process procedure whereby incompetent, involuntary mentally ill patients
are guaranteed dignity and liberty.222
The first issue that must be examined is whether the liberty interest of
an incompetent patient is recognized under the Constitution. Second, if
such an interest is constitutionally recognized, it is necessary to analyze the
procedural safeguards available to protect a patient's interest from bodily
intrusion. Finally, this Comment suggests various proposals for the admin-
istration of due process once the patient has been found incompetent.
A. The Personal Liberty Interests of an Incompetent
Patient Deserve Recognition
There exist legitimate governmental concerns to justify treating the
mentally ill differently from mentally healthy individuals with respect to
treatment decisions.22 However, the distinctions between mentally ill pa-
tients are less certain concerning the interests accorded competent and in-
competent patients. For instance, federal courts have recognized inherent
liberty interests of a competent patient and have found a right to refuse
antipsychotic drugs absent an emergency. 24 Because federal courts have
limited the right to refuse antipsychotic drugs to competent patients, it can
be implied that the liberty afforded to incompetent individuals is subject to
limitation. While incompetent patients are denied the right to partake in
the medical decision-making process on the federal level, the federal courts
need to recognize the liberty interests of such persons by assuring the
proper administration of drugs.22 5
221. An incompetent person is incapable of exercising informed consent. See supra notes 44-
59 and accompanying text.
222. For example, Wisconsin appoints guardians for non-institutionalized persons who are
declared incompetent to consent to psychotropic medication. Wis. STAT. §§ 880.33(4m),
880.01(7m) (1987-88). While this is a step toward securing liberty for incompetent patients, more
legislation is needed to protect institutionalized, incompetent mental patients' liberty from careless
drug administration.
223. The state's police power and parens patriae provide justification for forcible medication
of individuals in certain circumstances. See supra notes 84-109 and accompanying text.
224. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979); Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp.
1294 (D.N.J. 1979).
225. The state court in Rogers recognized the right for incompetent patients to refuse anti-
psychotic drugs. "'The recognition of that right must extend to the case of an incompetent, as
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One argument asserted to defeat an incompetent patient's liberty inter-
ests is that such person lacks an appreciation of his or her actions and as a
result, society should be less concerned about protecting that individual's
liberty. This argument fails for two reasons. First, nothing suggests that
because a person cannot articulate the advantages and disadvantages of a
proposed treatment plan the or she does not value and appreciate their free-
dom from antipsychotic drugs. Second, measuring the entitlement to per-
sonal liberty based on an individual's level of functioning would entail
difficult decisions regarding the weight and merits of the liberty interests of
competent and incompetent patients.226
Another argument propounded to justify limiting an incompetent pa-
tient's liberty interest is that procedural safeguards would constitute too
great an intrusion on the medical profession. Society hesitates to burden
the medical profession with rules, fearing that to do so will disserve the
patient's best interests. However, the medical practice is already subject to
outside constraints, such as the requirement of informed consent before cer-
tain medical procedures can be carried out.227 Since incompetent patients
are incapable of giving informed consent, the argument for alternative safe-
guards to guarantee the protection of their liberty interests is heightened.
The methods set forth below need not excessively intrude upon the psychia-
trist's judgment, rather, they will monitor it.
B. The Need for a Temporary Guardian for Incompetent Patients
The Constitution requires that no individual be singled out for a depri-
vation of a constitutional liberty without due process. 228 If the forcible ad-
ministration of drugs to mentally incompetent individuals is to receive
judicial sanction, the court should require more than a physician's profes-
sional judgment. A strong due process argument can be made that an adju-
dication of incompetency should not automatically authorize the
administration of antipsychotic drugs, but, instead, should transfer deci-
sion-making authority to a guardian. 29
well as a competent, patient because the value of human dignity extends to both ....... Rogers v.
Comm'r of Dept. of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 499-500, 458 N.E.2d 308, 315 (1983) (quoting
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 745-46, 370 N.E.2d 417,
427 (1977)). This Comment argues that this standard ought to be recognized on a federal level.
226. Saks, The Use of Mechanical Restraints in Psychiatric Hospitals, 95 YALE L.J. 1836,
1849 (1986). In O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), the Court rejected the argument
that the liberty of mentally ill people is any less valuable than that of others in society. Id. at 575.
227. Saks, supra note 226, at 1849.
228. "No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
229. See Zander, supra note 36, at 72.
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The professional judgment standard articulated in Romeo should not be
presumed valid in mentally incompetent patient's cases for two reasons.
First, the professional judgment standard did not directly apply to an invol-
untarily committed mentally ill patient, but rather to a mentally retarded
individual2 30 Second, although professional judgment is necessary in every
medical decision, presuming it to be valid does not adequately protect the
liberty interests of an incompetent patient. A guardian would better secure
due process protection for the incompetent patient refusing antipsychotic
drugs.
The professional judgment standard of Romeo was developed to balance
the state's interests and a mentally retarded individual's interest in proper
institutional care. 31 In Romeo the patient was faced with the concern of
poor institutional conditions. However, in the case of a mentally ill patient,
the concern is the forcible use of intrusive antipsychotic drugs. Because
mental retardation differs greatly from a mental illness such as schizophre-
nia, insofar as the latter is not always permanent, professional judgment
should not be presumed valid for mentally ill patients. Furthermore, a psy-
chiatrist may or may not look to alternative treatments if he or she knows
the choice of antipsychotic treatment will be presumed valid.
Guardianship offers better procedural due process protection than the
professional judgment standard.232 Regardless of the guardianship's partic-
ular form,233 due process is its historical and theoretical foundation.2 34 A
patient must be declared incompetent before the court may authorize a
guardian to act.23' Although guardians are appointed for incompetent pa-
tients to manage their affairs, presently there is no federal mandate to ap-
point guardians for incompetent patients refusing antipsychotic drugs.
230. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 307.
231. Id.
232. Procedural due process guarantees that each individual shall be accorded a certain pro-
cess if they are deprived of life, liberty, or property. For a general discussion of procedural due
process, see L NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 7, at 451-72.
233. There are four basic types of guardianship arrangements. The first is plenary guardian-
ship which involves the entire set of decision-making rights that can be implicated by an incompe-
tency adjudication. Secondly, guardianship of the estate involves those rights dealing with an
incompetent's financial and property interests. Next, guardianship of the person involves the re-
maining interests having to do with personal decision-making. The final type, limited guardian-
ship, is a modem convention that individualizes the decision-making structure to the needs of the
individual; only decisions affected by the person's incompetence are made part of the guardianship
order. Parry, Selected Recommendations From the National Guardianship Symposium At Wing-
spread, 12 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 398, 399 (1988). For purposes of this
Comment, when referring to guardianship, limited guardianship will be the type implied.
234. Id. at 398.
235. Id.
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Incompetent patients desperately need a guardian to act as a shield
against imprudent decisions by psychiatrists. The physician's role in the
treatment of competent patients is merely to provide medical information,
which a patient has a right to act upon. That function should not be ac-
corded presumptive validity based on the patient's incompetent status.236
The state may argue that by holding medical decisions "presumptively
valid" 23 7 the institutions will be spared a long, arduous, and costly process.
However, speedy adjudication should not be the only goal of judicial rea-
soning. Rather, adequate protection of the valid liberty interest in being
free from unnecessary antipsychotic medication should be given equal con-
sideration. By forcibly medicating an incompetent patient, absent review of
that decision and without a guardian to assure proper administration of the
drug, the patient's procedural due process rights are violated.238
C. Proposals to Ensure Procedural Due Process Protection for
Incompetent Patients
Thus far, this Comment has suggested that the court should appoint a
guardian which would allow the incompetent patient to properly exercise
his or her right of self-determination. The following sections outline proce-
dures that will safeguard an incompetent patient's liberty interests.
1. Separate Competency Hearing at the Time of Refusal
Because the patient's level of competency may change from the time of
the commitment hearing to the time when antipsychotic medication is pre-
scribed, a separate competency hearing should be held to determine if the
patient could exercise informed consent and legally refuse treatment at that
time. The danger in foregoing a separate hearing is that the time span be-
tween the initial commitment hearing and the decision to medicate may be
too great. To be accurate, competency should be measured at the time the
decision to administer antipsychotic drugs is made.239
2. Review the Decision to Administer Antipsychotic Drugs
Since antipsychotic drugs carry with them potentially dangerous side
effects, every decision to administer this type of drug needs review by a
236. Cox, Government as Arbiter, Not Custodian: Relational Privacy as Foundation For a
Right to Refuse Medical Treatment Prolonging Incompetents' Lives, 18 N.M.L. REV. 131, 150
(1988).
237. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 323.
238. The suggested duties of a guardian to ensure adequate due process is discussed infra
notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
239. See Parry, supra note 48, at 35.
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physician outside the mental health facility. Although this may seem like a
clinical impracticability, the guardian could secure the second opinion, thus
alleviating the burden on the attending physician. Anything less than a
review of this nature compromises the incompetent patient's due process
interests by presuming that antipsychotic drugs best treat the illness.
If the second physician suggests alternative treatment plans, the guard-
ian would be required to exhaust all least restrictive alternatives.' On the
other hand, if antipsychotic drugs are found to be the desired course of
treatment, the guardian would be delegated the following responsibilities:
(1) Monitor the dosage and reduce if necessary; (2) Observe patient for
signs of tardive dyskinesia and either substitute with another drug, or termi-
nate treatment completely; and (3) Demand timely check-ups by the attend-
ing physician to evaluate treatment progression. Strict adherence to the
preceding guidelines will ensure the patient's guarantee of self-determina-
tion to the greatest extent possible.
3. Substitute Decision-Making
The modem trend with respect to the guardian's role is that of substi-
tute decision-making. It guides the court and guardian by the values and
choices the incompetent person would have made had he or she been com-
petent. 41 This standard determines a course of treatment according to the
best interests of the patient.
One final point regarding the decision-making authority of a guardian
needs to be addressed. The courts must institute a process whereby guardi-
anship can be limited or terminated if the above proposals are not followed.
While this may overburden the courts, this final proposal is the only way to
protect an incompetent patient from arbitrary decision-making by a physi-
cian or a guardian.
V. CONCLUSION
The right to refuse antipsychotic medication is an essential civil liberty
for thousands of institutionalized mental patients throughout the country.
These drugs are highly intrusive and often cause serious and sometimes
irreversible side effects. Because an incompetent patient is unable to make
240. For a discussion of the least restrictive alternative doctrine see supra notes 110-30 and
accompanying text.
241. In July 1988, the American Bar Association's Commission on the Mentally Disabled
and Legal Problems of the Elderly held a National Guardianship Symposium. The purpose of the
symposium was to draft recommendations for reforming the due process and monitoring failures
in 2,200 guardianships nationwide. Parry, supra note 233, at 398.
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treatment decisions, that patient's right to control his or her own treatment
decision should also include access to a guardian who would make decisions
concerning medication.
The decisions in Rennie, Rogers, and Romeo obscure the real nature of
the drug issue and yield too much discretion to medical professionals.
There is evidence to suggest an excess in prescribing antipsychotic medica-
tion within mental institutions. In addition, the courts have propounded a
belief that decisions made by the professionals will, necessarily, produce
decisions consonant with constitutional values such as procedural due pro-
cess. Until the use of antipsychotic medication can be replaced with an
equally effective mode of treatment without the debilitating side effects,
both psychiatry and law must deal with the difficulty of weighing the pa-
tient's right to refuse against the state's desire to do what is best for its
citizens. During this balancing process, it is imperative that the personal
liberty rights of incompetent mentally ill citizens are especially safeguarded.
The appointment of a guardian can serve as an important instrument for
patients and advocates of mental patients' rights working to restore to such
patients the due process protection by avoiding the inescapable effects of
antipsychotic drugs. Such due process protection should be considered a
basic personal liberty interest and fundamental concept of human dignity
and should no longer be denied to incompetent patients. Although the law
cannot cure mental illness, it can prevent the unnecessary imposition of
intrusive drugs and give credence to the patient's best interests and due
process rights.
MARY C. MCCARRON
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